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JUDGE CAVERLY'S DECISION
The legislature of Pennsylvania has divided the Acts
which constitute murder into two classes, murder of the
first degree, and murder of the second degree. It is not
for court or jury, to make the distinction. That is made by
the facts. If there was the intention to kill, or if the killing, though unintended, was incident to the commission of,
or the attempt to commit, arson, or rape, or robbery, or
burglary, or kidnapping, the killing is declared by the statute to be murder of the first degree. Murder without the
intention to kill, and without the act of arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, or kidnapping, or the attempt to commit arson, or
rape, or robbery, or burglary, or kidnapping, is murder of the second degree. The two classes of acts "shall
be deemed murder of the first degree," or shall be
Shall be
deemed murder of the second degree."
Clearly by him or them, whose
deemed by whom?
function it is, to administer the penalty; by the jury, no
less than by the judge. Since the indictment does not need
to define, and does not define the degree, and since the pun-
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ishments for the two classes of murder are different, it is
plain that the jury, in case of a jury trial, must say whether
the facts ascertained, make guilt of murder of the first degree or of the second degree, or of some crime of inferior
turpitude.
There are a few decisions which seem to hold that
the court must not too strongly urge on the jury that it has
a duty to accept the statutory classification. It must apparently be allowed to find that malicious killing with intention, is murder of the second degree. It is to be hoped
that the authority of these decisions may be soon repudiated, and the propriety of the court's instructing a jury that it
should find murder of the first degree, when it finds ',
facts which the legislature has told it to deem murder of
the first degree is unquestionable. The utility of the jury
system is much weakened, when the jury is told that it may,
though finding the legislative elements of the first degree,
refuse to give a verdict for other than the second degree.
Illinois has not divided murder into two degrees. It
however has shown a concsiousness of the many shades of
atrocity, hardness of heart, etc., with which a killing may be
committed. Instead of making classes, with definitions, it
has allowed within limits the jury to apportion punishment. "Whoever" says the statute, "is guilty of murder
shall suffer the punishment of death, or imprisonment in
the penitentiary." Imprisonment how long? "For his
natural life or for a term not less than 14 years." "If the
accused is found guilty by a jury, they shall fix the punishment by their verdict." The defendants were not found
guilty by a jury. They pleaded guilty. "Upon a plea of
guilty" says the statute, "the punishment shall be fixed by
the court." The opinion of court or jury, as to the malignity
of the crime, is not expressed by classifying it, as in Pennsylvania, as of first, or second degree, but by determining
the kind or degree of punishment. Finding the accused
guilty of murder, by the defendant's confession, the court
must sentence either to death, or to imprisonment, and this
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imprisonment must be for life, or for not less than fourteen
years.
The defendants have not pleaded insanity. If insane
when the killing was committed, they would not have been
guilty of any crime, and acquittal would have been unavoidable. Judge Caverly ventures to say that they could not
successfully have alleged insanity, in the legal sense of that
word, "as defined and understood by the established law of
this state, for the purpose of the administration of criminal
justice." If Illinois has a satisfactory definition and understanding of "insanity," it is more fortunate than some other
states. The ineptitude of the explanations attempted in this
state by Gibson, C. J. in Commonwealth vs. Mosler, 4 Pa.
264 and by succeeding judges, is disappointing. Insanity
seems to consist of the inability to form the concept of
moral and legal right and wrong, or correctly to apply the
correct concept, to the particular act, of which the defendant
is accused, or to consist of subjection to impulses which are
irresistible, to commit the act, "sometimes," as Gibson C. J.
remarks, "called homicidal mania." Whether the judical
or legislative mind of Illinois has been able to elaborate a
better definition, we do not undertake to say. Enough
that Judge Caverly finds that Illinois insanity does not exist in the cases of Loeb and Leopold.
Notwithstanding its conclusion that there was no insanity, the court finds "abnormalities of mind." Insanity is
a species of abnormality, but, we descry that there are abnormalities which, neither in tone nor degree, amount to
insanity. Insanitly would have produced irresponsibility.
But, what is the result of the lower shades of abnormality?
"The prisoners," says the judge, "have been shown, in essential respects, to be adnormal." In what respects? Had
they had the ordinary abhorrence of killiing an unoffending
youth; had they had the usual mercy, pity, justice, respect
for the prohibitions of the law, for the voice of public opinion, for the precepts of morality and religion, they would not
have done what they did. "Had they been normal, they
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would not have committed the crime." Most true. What
serious crime is there, that would have been committed, had
the guilty person been normal? The court has said that
this crime would not have been committed had the prisoners been normal.
What use then, is to be made by the judge or jury,
when he or it discovers this abnormality? Without it the
crime would not have been done. Is it then to be condoned?
Is it to be deemed involuntary and for that reason not
amenable to penalty? Reflection on the abnormality of
the minds of the defendants does not seem to have conducted the judge to any practical conclusion. "It is beyond the
province of the court," he remarks "or it is beyond the capacity of human science, in its present state of development,
to predicate ultimate responsibility for human acts." Ultimate responsibility? The penal death of the murderers
would seem to imply an ultimate responsibility to his fellowmen; to the state. Does the judge refer to responsibility
to God; to a punishment after death? That decision of this
question was "beyond the province of this court" is not surprising; what is surprisingg is that the judge should have
thought it useful to tell us, that he would not "predicate ultimate responsibility for human acts." Theologians and
philosophers might undertake this function but that the secular state or its agents should assume it, it is too late, in
the centuries, and under a constitution that divorces religion from the government, to expect.
We have arrived at "abnormalities." But, their kind
or degree is not indicated, and, strange to say, no use is made
of the fact that they exist in the prisoners, or that, had they
not existed, the prisoners would not have done their horrid
deed.
Apparently to soothe the counsel for the defense, and
the psychiatrists produced by them, the judge, after virtually saying that their efforts with regard to abnormality
were fruitless, expresses willingness to concede that the testimony regarding the life history, and the present mental,
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emotional and ethical condition, had been of "extreme interest," and was a valuable contribution to criminology. The
court too clearly sees that similar analyses "of other persons accused of crime would probably reveal similar or different abnormalities." In short, as much could be said to
mitigate punishment in every case, because of abnormalities,
as had been said, at the procurement of large expenditures of
money, on behalf of the two criminals.
The court then expresses a judgment concerning the
crime, similar to that of the thousands who have followed the
report of the trial. It was a crime of singular atrocity. "It
was delibrately planned and prepared for during a considerable period of time. It was executed with every feature of
callousness and cruelty." It was abhorrent to every instinct
of humanity."
The court is satisfied that neither in the act itself, nor
in its motive or lack of motive, nor in the ant'ecedents of the
offenders, can be found any mitigating circumstances."
For a crime of this gravity, then, what is to be the punishment? Is it to be death?
The court mourns over the fact that he has no colleagues to share the responsibility which ,when he took office, he knew that he was assuming. The law has given no
rule for the guidance of his discretion. It was possibly because no rule could be prescribed that the discretion was
conferred. "The court would have welcomed the counsel
and support of others." But the office was sought for,
and that this was one of its duties, when the occasion presented itself, was apparent. We do not see that any sympathy is to be felt for the censure or obloquy to which his
act, conscientiously done, exposes him. The suggestion that
a bench of three Judges, would be better, to determine the
punishment in cases similar to the Leopold-Loeb case, while
inappositely appearing in a judgment of the court, might be
worthy of consideration by the legislature.
Precisely what is meant by the statement, that to impose
the "extreme penalty of the law," viz. death "would have
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been the path of least resistance," we cannot say. It is
about as easy to sentence to imprisonment for life, as to
death. It may have been more satisfying to the crowd to sentence to death but a judge is not supposed to consider the sentiment of onlookers and readers of imperfect newspaper reports. But, this is a prelude to a singular position. The court
virtually says, that, if the accused had been over 21 years
old, (when they committed the crime or when they were
sentenced), he would have inflicted death. He substitutes life
imprisonment, because the accused are not of full age. Why?
Is it because youth appeals, as older years do not, for mercy
No such reason is insinuated. The reasons are that abstinence from capitally punishing men accords with the
progress of criminal law all over the world. It also agrees
with the dictates of enlightened humanity. It agrees with
the precedents of Illinois. We are not aware that enlightened humanity has opposed the death penalty in the case of
persons under age.
But, sparing the prisoners from the death penalty it
seems, is not a sign of humanity. "To the offenders particularly of the type they are the prolonged suffering of years
of confinement, may well be" says the judge, "the severer
form of retribution and expiation." Then why is this
"severer form" imposed on youths?
The judge was thinking of the answer that people would
make to the suggestion that imprisonment for life was worse
than death. They were saying, but a life imprisonment in
Illinois, is not a life imprisonment. Wealth, political influence, which can be procured by weath, will secure the
liberation of the prisoners, in three, four, six years, while
the politicians or the pardon board cannot bring back to life
a man once dead.
The court attempts to soothe the apprehensive spirit of
citizens, by saying, "it is entirely within the discretion of
the department of Public Welfare, never to admit these defendants to parole. To such a policy the court .urges them
strictly to adhere." But the department is under no duty
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to accept suggestions from the judge, and it might retort
that it would not rectify the bad effects of the court's exercise of discretion, by surrendering its own.
It is quite clear that the defining of punishment for
crimes is a function of the legislature, and not of the judiciary. The judge does not undertake to abolish capital punishment in Illinois; that is, capital punishment of persons
over 21 years old. But, he virtually abolishes it, so far as its
enforcement depends on him, in the case of murderers, below 21 years of age. Perhaps he will next discover that
women should not be executed, that college graduates
through a revived benefit of clergy should not be executed,
rior poor persons, nor rich persons, nor geniuses in music,
mathematics, psychology, science, generally. Some of
the most cruel and abhorrent murders have been
committed by minors. The distinction between above and
below 21 years of age, is artificial. The life history of
criminals of 50 years of age, may sometimes give cause for
pity and mitigation of punishment, when that of the youthful criminal fails to do so.
We should regret deeply if this opinion of the judge
should induce the legislature to accept the penological principles which without much reflection he has propounded as
apologies for the purposed decision. But, of this acceptance there is little risk.
Repealing capital punishment altogether, has something to be said in defence of it, but repealing it, in regard to
persons below 21 years, would be endlessly regrettable,
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THE 16TH AMENDMENT
In fashioning the super-state, to be called the United
States of America, it was necessary to provide money for its
government. Governments are spending and not wealth producing institutions. Conceivably, the plan might have been
adopted by the Constitution makers of imposing the duty of
making the necessary contributions upon the states. The Articles of Confederation, the adoption of which preceded by
only seven years that of the so-called Constitution, provided
"All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied
by the several states in proportion to the value of all lands
within each state, granted to or surveyed for any persons, as
such land and buildings and improvements thereon shall be
estimated according to such mode as the United States in
Congress assembled shall from time to time direct and appoint." The legislatures of the states were to raise their several obligatory contributions, by taxation. Experience
showed the unwillingness of states to furnish their assessment by contributions and to attempt to coerce them would
have meant civil war and the swift dissolution of the Union.
But, while the policy of requiring the states to obtain the
money from their citizens and subjects, might have been
abandoned, the gross sums necessary from time to time,
might have been imposed on the states, while the United
States distributed this burden on the citizens of the states,
and used its own machinery for compelling payment. The
aim of the framers was to apportion on the communities called states, the expenses of the general government in some
equitable way. The confederation thought that taxes should
be paid by the states according to wealth, and that the constituents of their wealth could be assumed to be the lands
owned by individuals, and the buildings and improvements
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thereon. The burdens borne by the people of the states
would have been in proportion to their land wealth.
The Constitution gave to the United States, the power
of taxing the citizens and inhabitants of the States. But it
has classified taxes. Congress shall have power "to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises."
It distinguishes duties, imposts and excises, not from
each other, but from taxes. "All duties, imposts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States." But the
Constitution says, "Representatives and direct taxes shall
be apportioned among the several states, which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers." Are we to assume that the word "taxes," used in
conjunction with "duties, imposts and excises," is the equivalent of "direct taxes." May there be taxes which, distinct
from "duties, imposts and excises," are nevertheless indirect?
Chief Justice Fuller probably intends to say that there are
no such "taxes." "Although there have been from time to
time, intimations that there might be some tax which was
not a direct tax, nor included under the words "duties, imposts and excises, such a tax for more than 100 years of national existence, has as yet remained undiscovered, notwithstanding the stress of particular circumstances has invited
thorough investigation into sources of revenue." Pollock V.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 157 U. S. 529; 158 U. S. 601.
Taxes, then let us assume, means "direct taxes."
The distinction between "taxes" and duties, imposts and
excises, would be wholly unimportant, but for the requirement that taxes, i. e. direct taxes, shall be apportioned among
the states, while the duties, imposts and excises do not need,
do not admit of, apportionment but must be geographically
uniform. Why were those two rules prescribed? We might
a priori have suspected that the difference between them
was well known, and that their several attributes justified
such a different qualification of the mode of assessment.
The only specimen of a direct tax mentioned in the Constitution is a "capitation tax." Says Art. 1, Sect. 9, Clause
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4, "No capitation or other direct tax, shall be laid unless in
proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken."
Unfortunately, while daring to lay down two rules for
the assessment of taxes, and duties, imposts and excises,
there is nothing to indicate that the framers had any clear
conception of a difference between them. In one of the debates in the Convention, Mr. Madison records, "Mr. King
asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation. No
one answered." The effect of the application of the rule of
apportionment to taxes which have, after more than a century, i. e. in 1895 been discovered to be direct, is so preposterous and intolerable, that we readily preceive that the makers of the constitution, in speaking of direct taxes, were
speaking of that of which they had no clear conception.
Capitation taxes are apportionable among the states, but
as they are taxes on individuals, for being individuals within
the ambit of the taxing power, such a tax is necessarily if uniform, proportionate to population. 100,000 men in state
A, would pay the same capitation tax as 100,000 men in
state B. The tax per capita would be multiplied by the
number of heads. But, it is evident that the rule of uniformity would produce the same result. Apportionment
ceases to be absurd, because it is, as applied to this tax, a different name for observing uniformity.
But, let us contemplate the results of the rule of apportionment, if applied to other subjects, taxation of which has,
by the belated wisdom of the Supreme Court been discovered to be direct. Speaking of Pollock vs. Farmers Loan, etc.
Co. 158 U. S., Cooley says "As the law now stands, the following are direct taxes, a capitation tax, a tax on real estate,
on the income from real estate, on personal property and on
the income from personal property." Constitutional Law,
page 63. A tax on land, then, is a direct tax, and must be
apportioned according to what? to its area? to its value? to
anything which ought to regulate it? No, but to population.
If land in state A is worth $100,000,000. and in state B is
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worth one tenth of that amount, $10,000,000, the land tax
payable by the land owners of the two states must be the
same, if their populations are the same in number. Is the
tax assessed on income? Then, the burden will fall, not as it
should, in porportion to the income, but in proportion to the
state's population. Two states have, each 1,000,000 inhabitants, but the incomes of state A average $1000; those of
State B $5000. But, the people of $1000 income must pay
as much income tax as those of $5000 income, because the
populations of the two states are the same. A tax is levied
on cattle, on horses: but the same amount of cattle tax must
be paid by two states if they have the same population, although state A has cattle 20 times more numerous and valuable than has state B.
The courts early preceived the shocking absurdity of
the rule of apportionment and sought to restrict the baleful
and preposterous effects of its application, by arbitrarily saying that only a tax on land could be considered direct. This
view came to prevail. It is expressed by writers on the Constitution; by Storey, Kent, Pomeroy, Miller, Hare, Barroughs,
Cooley. With whatever intention, in 1895 the Supreme Court
made it impossible to tax land, or its proceeds, personalty,
or its proceeds, by adjudging any law taxing these objects, to
be void, unless it imposed the tax by apportionment among
the states, according to their populations.
Public opinion has not been disposed to tolerate this
rule. Hence Congress has been compelled to desist from
taxing many things, or subtle distinctions, having no real relevancy, have been resorted to. Instead of taxing an income, the Congress may tax the industry, the capacity, the
legal authority to do the acts which produce the income, and
such a tax need not be apportioned. If the tax is imposed
on the income, "solely because of its ownership." it is direct, even if called by the Act of Congress a duty, or excise.
But, a tax on the doing of business, which is measured by
the income, is not a tax on the income. A tax of one percent
of the net incomes above $5000 of sundry sorts of corpora-
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tions and companies, though unapportioned, is valid. It is
levied on the business and the product of the business; it is
measured by the product of, or the net income from, the
business. Hence, we shall call it, not a tax on income (direct tax), but, a 'duty or excise, an indirect tax. Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107. We shall say the tax is "imposed upon the exercise of the privilege of doing business
in a corporate capacity," and congratulate ourselves on our
acumen.
The result of the mistake of the framers, in regard to
direct tax could easily be avoided by a little verbal legerdemain. Is the tax on land? No, it is a tax on the privilege
of owning it. Is the tax on the rentals from land? No. It
is a tax on the industry, the business, the act of letting the
land to tenants. All that is necessary, is a change of the
point of view. The tax must not be imposed solely because
of the ownership of the land, or of the rents, or income. It
must be imposed because of the process of getting, earning,
etc., and not because of merely having.
A similar ingenuity will relieve from difficulty, in defending a federal impost on the acquisition by inheritance or
devise, of property by an heir or devisee. A federal war
revenue tax, of June 13th, 1898, imposed a succession tax on
legacies or distributive shares of personality, passing at death.
But it did not apportion the tax according to the population
of the states. Was it a direct tax? The answer by Justice
White was, no. The rule of apportionment emanated, he
says, from the purpose of preventing taxes on personalty
solely because of the "general ownership of property, from
being imposed, except according to population." The tax
was a "duty or excise"; that is, a tax on X for owning personalty, might be a direct tax, but a tax on him for becoming the owner of personalty, in a special mode, bequest, inheritance, is not direct. It is an excise. Hence, if the
mode of having become owner is contemplated by the statute,
the tax will not be direct. A tax on chattels owned is direct, a tax on the beginning to own, the process of becoming
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owner, is indirect. Knowlton v. Moore, 178. U. S. 41,
Scholey v. Reno 23 Wall. 349.
The courts, then, have means of saving taxes from nullification, by discovering that they are not imposed" solely
because of general ownership." Knowlton v. Moore, supra,
which means, solely because of ownership.
A tax on income is not imposed, or at least, need not be
imposed, solely because the person taxed owns the income.
It may be imposed because he has won it by his industry,
ingenuity, the utilization of business opportunities; the consumption of capital in owning it; by skill in finding a buyer
or a lessee. The income taxes, etc. are voidable, because of
the omission by Congress, in the acts imposing them, to describe them as imposed on earned, won, acquired income, or
property.
Some members of congress having grown weary of
the nullification of tax laws because they did not commit the
absurdity of apportionment, have attempted to get rid of the
pretext for nullification, so far as taxes on income are concerned. The 16th Amendment, proclaimed in Feb. 25th,
1913, declares that "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on income from whatever source derived
without apportionment among the several states and without
regard to any census or enumeration."
It is remarkable that those who invented this amendment, while seeing the folly of requiring taxes on incomes
to be apportioned, did not see that it was equally foolish to
require apportionment of othter taxes, and did not altogether
abolish the requirement of apportionment. And the Supreme Court has intimated that the apportionment principle
shall be retained except in so far as it has been excluded
by strict construction of the Amendment. Says Pitney J. in
Eisner v. Macomber, 253 U. S. 189, "A proper regard for its
genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also that
this amendment shall not be extended by loose construction so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income,
those provisions of the constitution that require an appor-
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tionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, real or personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is not to be over-ridden by
Congress or disregarded by the courts." This seems to be a
warning that the taxableness of property, real or personal,
or the proceeds of such property, unless they be "income,"
shall continue to be so conditioned as to be impracticable.
Of the direct taxes, it is only the tax on income, that escapes
from the requirement that it be apportioned.
The language of the amendment might lead to the
question whether all income was not subject to the taxing
power of Congress: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on income from whatever source derived,
without apportionment." But some incomes are derived
from salaries as judges, federal or state, or as other officers.
Has Congress power to tax the Federal judges' incomes, so
far as composed of their salaries? We may be sure that it
will be adjudged not to have such power. May congress tax
the incomes of state officers, composed of their compenastions as such? Equally sure is it, that the power to tax
them will not be found in the 16th amendment. It will receive the interpretation that taxes assessable under the original constitution on incomes, but subject to the rule of apportionment, shall hereafter be assessable, without such apportionment. No classes of incomes not previously taxable
by Congress, have become taxable. The change is in the
abolition of the requirement that, in taxing incomes, the
tax must be apportioned according to population.
The taxing of incomes, is the taxing which the amendment undertakes to regulate. What then are incomes? In
the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, 252 U. S. 189, is
an intimation that that may be income, in the 16th Amendment sense, which would not be income in the popular, or
usual, or even strictly appropriate sense. A stock dividend,
he thought was, "on sound principles," not "income," but he
intimates that the word "income" may, in the thought of
those in Congress who submitted the amendment, and those
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in the legislatures that ratified it, have had a wider meaning;
a meaning wide enough to include a stock dividend. "I
think" he says, "that the word income in the 16th Amendment should be read in a sense most obvious to the common
understanding at the time of its adoption, for it was for public adoption that it was proposed." It was not proposed for
public adoption. Select men namely those in the senate and
house of representatives formed the phrases of the proposal,
and select men in the state legislatures ratified it. How are
we to know that there was a legislator's interpretation of
the word, different from the interpretation dictated by
"sound principles"? The justice proceeds to say, "The
known purpose of the amendment was to get rid of nice
questions as to what might be direct taxes.
I can not
doubt that most people not lawyers would suppose when
they voted for it, that they put a question like the present,
to rest." But, the lawyers in congress submitted the amendment, and the multitudinous lawyers in the state legislatures,
ratified it. Why are we not to accept the interpretation
which those lawyers probably put on the words? Whither
will we be conducted if we adopt the policy of discarding the
meanings attributed to words and phrases by people of
the intelligence of those who adopt the language, in favor
of some suspected meaning attributed to them by the less intelligent class?
The abstract question, what is income, we shall not here
consider. The exact question with which the Supreme Court
has dealt is, is a stock dividend distributed by a corporation
among its stock-holders, to be regarded as income, and is
the taxation of it exempt from the duty of apportionment by
population. A corporation voted to transfer $1,500,000,
profits earned before Jan. 13, 1913, to its capital account, and
to issue 15,000 shares of stock representing that amount, to
its stock holders. The distribution took place on Jan. 12th,
1914. X, a stockholder, received as his portion, 4174 1-2
shares. The tax officer compelled him to pay an income tax
on those shares, as of the value of $417,450. In a suit by him
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to recover back the tax paid, it was held by Holmes J. that
the dividend was not income, but capital, whether for the
purpose of the Income Tax Law, or for distribution between
life-tenant and remainderman. He adopts the language of
another judge. "A stock dividend really takes nothing from
the property of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the stockholders. Its property is not diminished
and their interests are not increased. The proportional interest of each stockholder remains the same. The only
change is in the evidence which represents that interest,
the new shares and the original shares together representing
the same proportion of interests that the original shares
represented before the issue of the new ones. In short, the
corporation is no poorer and the stockholder is no richer
than they were before." If the plaintiff gained any small
advantage by the change, it certainly was not an advantage
of $417,450, the sum upon which he was taxed." Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U. S. 418. In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189,
a similar question was presented. The conclusion reached
b~f six of the nine Justices, by the same process of reasoning,
was the same, Mr. Justice Pitney writing the opinion for
the majority. Mr. Justice Holmes, not contesting the soundness of the conclusion that there was no income in fact from
the increase of the shares of stock, nevertheless, thought that
there was something to tax, but what it was he did not reveal. We may say that Justice Brandeis dissented from the
rest of the majority of the court, in a notable opinion.
In conclusion we may say that what is needed is first,
perspicacity enough to see how absurd the provision for apportionment is; how intolerable it has become by the 1895
interpretation of direct taxes, and then courage to propose
what to the politically superstitious is the sacrilegious act
of expelling from the constitution the futile and preposterous
requirements that any taxes be apportioned according to the
population of the states.
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MOOT COURT
HALLAM VS. FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Banks and Banking-Forged Drafts-Negotiable Instruments
May 16, 1901-P. L. 194.

Act

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hallam was the executor of his father's estate. The father's
will gave a legacy of $2,000 to one George Shope, living in Cresson.
In order to pay this, Hallam purchased a draft from the defendant, payable to Shope, drawn on a bank In Cresson. Someone other
than Shope received this draft, and endorsed on It Shope's name,
and pretending to the bank to be Shope, obtained payment. Six
months later, Shope, not having been paid the legacy and knowing
nothing of the draft, demanded payment. Hallam paid, and now sues
the defendant for the money improperly paid the forger of Shope's
name.
Kauffman, for Plaintiff.
Miss Huber, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Hoerle, J. The counsel for the defendant cites the act of April
5, 1849, but we think that the case can be disposed of without reference to that act, for there is no evidence of diligence or negligence
to be gathered from the facts on the part of either drawer or drawee.
In the National Fire Insurance Company vs. Mellon National
Bank, in 276 Pa. 212, the rule was laid down that "where the drawer
knows that the payee Is a real person and intends that he should
be paid, and the payee's indorsement is forged, the bank that pays
on the forged indorsement Is liable for the loss." By an application
of this rule it is evident that the drawee in the principle case can
not recover the amount paid on the forged indorsement from the
drawer. Then the defendant is in possession of the $2,000 which
Hallam paid as consideration for the draft, and if allowed to retain it, the defendant is unjustly enriched to the extent of $2,000
and Hallam Is deprived of the same amount which he paid to Shope.
The drawer of a draft undertakes that the drawee shall be
found in the place where he Is described to be and shall have effects
In his hands, and from these, or upon other consideration (good as
between drawer and drawee and with which the payee has nothing
to do), pay the bill to the person therein named. Parks vs. Ingram,
22 N. H. 283 and National Bank vs. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367.The mere
act of drawing a draft imports a certain and precise contract. The
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defendant performed all of the undertakings except the last and
most vital-payment to the person named in its draft. For breach
of this obligation, judgment is entered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Affirmed.

SNAIL VS RAILROAD COMPANY
Railroads-Grade crossing-Negligence-Damages--leasure
ages-Trivial error in

of daur

charge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In attempting to drive his wagon across the tracks of the defendant, its locomotive negligently ran into the plaintiff's wagon
and he was seriously hurt. The court told the jury "that if the negligent act of the defendant's agent caused the accident, Snail was
entitled to a sum equal to the product of the loss in earning power
per year by the number of years that he would probably live." The
jury finding the earning power of the first year reduced by three
hundred dollars, and the life expectancy of Snail twenty years
gave a verdict of three hundred dollars times twenty or six thousand
dollars.
Error is alleged in the court's instructions.
Chaplin, for Plaintiff.
Smith, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
McGuire, J. It may be conceded that upon the question of
error by the court below in his charge to the jury this is a close
case. However, after a careful review of the decisions governing
such a question the court is of the opinion that the lower court
erred in so instructing the jury, and In overruling the defendant's
objection.
Counsel for the defendant presented a very concise and able
argument to the court in support of his contention.
Counsel for the plaintiff contends that the judgment should not
be reversed because the verdict did not work any hardship on the
defendant, and that the amount awarded as damages was not excessive and was justified. Ir4 support of this contention he cites
several cases hereinafter mentioned.
However, the question involved here is not one of the adequacy
or inadequacy of the damages, but one of error In instructing the
jury.
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Counsel for the plaintiff further contends that even If there was
error it was of such a character as not to justify a reversal of the
judgment below. We are of the opinion that the learned counsel
is wrong in such a contention. To support his contention he cites 19
Sup. 525. This case stands for the proposition that In order for an
error of the kind in controversy to be a reversible one, it must
be apparent that not only an error has been committed, but that it
materially injured the rights of the party complaining. This, of
course, has been held in some few cases but the majority of cases
of this kind hold that where error is committed by the court and
causes the jury to render a verdict, that, in itself, causes material
injury to the person complaining. Such error is of a reversible
character.
We are of the opinion that the error committed by the court
below is certainly a reversible one.
Counsel for the plaintiff cites 17 C. J. 1087, which is to the effect that where the recovery Is so excessive or so grossly inadequate as to be indicative of prejudice, passion, partiality, or corruption on the part of the jury, or that the jury have acted against
the rules of law or have suffered their passions, prejudices, or preverse disregard of justice to mislead them, the verdict will be reversed.
We are of the opinion that It was not passion, prejudice, or disregard for justice that misled the jury, but that it was the instructions as given by the court below that tended to mislead them.
The counsel for the plaintiff also cites the case of Harris
v. R. R. Co. 35 Fed. 116. This case is one of illegal arrest, duress,
and false imprisonment, and has no bearing upon the issue at bar
whatever.
Further, counsel for the plaintiff cites 238 Pa. 1 to support his
cause, and that case was decided solely upon the erroneous instructions given by the court to the jury, the facts of which case
are indentical to those of the case at bar.
In Baker v. Irish 172 Pa. 528, cited by counsel for theh plaintiff,
the court said: "Now, as to pecuniary loss, that would have to be
estimated. The only evidence you have is that he was a boy in his
sixteenth year, and you can only estimate what his earning would
have been."

This clearly supports the doctrine that in estimating damages
for loss of future earning power, you base your calculations not

on what the injured person was capable of earning at the time of his
injury and multiplying that by the number of years of life expec,
tancy, but you must calculate his lost earning power on the basis

of what he would be capable of earning through the course of these
years had he not been injured, taking into consideration his manner
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of living, habits of life, state of health, character of employment,
the increasing disabilities of old age, and many other things of like
character which in the course of nature reduce the earning power.
Likewise when the loss of future earning power is anticipated in
the verdict, it should be the exact equivalent or present worth of
the injured person's loss of earning during the several, years of his
life's expectancy.
If there is only a partial loss of earning power, the jury must
determine what that partial loss is under the evidence, the number
of years it is likely to continue, and then find the present worth of
the amount so estimated.
It was clearly error for the court to Instruct the jury as it did,
and we are of the opinion that the jury was misled by such instructions.
The Instructions given by the court to the jury were too brief
and did not give them a clear insight as to how they were to compute the damages. Hence an inaccurate figure was arrived at.
In the present case it is a question of error and not one of materlal injury to the person complaining and we are of the opinion that
the court below erred In Its instructions.
In the course and hurry of the trial we have no doubt that the
Instructions were inadvertently given, but it Is clear error, due to
its incompleteness and brevity, and the judgment must be reversed
and a new trial ordered on these grounds.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The only error alleged to have been committed by the trial court
concerns the damages. The court has told the jury to find the loss
of earning power from the injury in a year and to multiply that with
the number of years of Snail's probable life.
This presupposes that the loss of one year will be the loss of
all the years. It Is always possible that a particular man will have
the same earning power for all the years of his future. But, if
these years are many, equality of earning power from the beginning
to the end of the series Is exceedingly improbable. The judge
should say nothing that might seem to be a direction to the jury to
assume such equality.
It was not erroneous to tell the jury to find the number of years
the plaintiff would probably live. No event of the future can be
more than probable. That a man, twenty years old, in apparently
good health will live one year is not certain but only probable; more
pirobable than that he will live two years; much more probable than
that he will live ten years, etc; but in allowing for loss of earning
power the jury must be content with merely a probable period, during which this power will be exerted.
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The jury may use tables of mortality. These tables show
merely the average addition of years among a considerable number
of observed lives, to those which had already been passed. Whether
X, who is thirty years old will live the average number of additional
years is a matter of speculation. He may live a longer or a shorter
life. He may die tomorrow. The speculative element can never be
eliminated. The health and soundness of men differ and are often
unknown to the neighbors of the man or even to himself. There is
also the probability of fatal accidents befalling him which cannot be
foreseen. The habits of self-control, of care of health, the nature of
the occupations pursued, will assist In determining how long the
individual will live.
Besides the error of the court in assuming that the earning
power for the future would be invariable until death and allowing
the Jury to multiply the annual loss of earning of the first few
years by the assumed number of years of the plaintiff's life, thb
court has committed another error in neglecting to note that the
verdict gives an Immediate sum of money to the plaintiff, whereas
he has to walt a year for the year's earnings, five years for the
fifth year's earnings, ten years for the tenth year's earnings, and
that what he is entitled to now is not $300 for the twentieth year's
earnings, but a sum of money which put at interest of five per
cent for twenty years and increased by this Interest, would equal
$300. That is, $113 with interest at five per cent being compounded
would amount to $300 in twenty years. $150 would, in twenty years,
interest not being compounded, produce $300. The plan of estimating the damages was then clearly erroneous.
Judgment affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH VS.
Act May 23, 1887. P.

MURPHY

L. 158-Criminal Law-Murder-Charge-Ref-

erence to prisoner not testifying.
STATEMENT

OF' FACTS

Murder. The evidence was circumstantial. The defendant gave
no evidence. In its charge the court said "that the failure of the
defendant to give evidence, his own or that of others, Is not to be
taken as any evidence of his guilt .It sometimes happens that
the defendant and his counsel think the evidence of the Commonwealth does not warrant a conviction, and hence that rebutting evidence is superfluous. That this Is the reason of the defendant
not giving any evidence Is to be presumed." Def. alleges that this
reference is a violation of Sec. 10, of the Act of May 23, 1887.
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Miss Caplan, for Commonwealth.
Croup, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Baratta, J. The Act of 1887, sec. 10, reads; "Except defendants
actually upon trial in a criminal court any competent witness may
be compelled to testify in any proceedings, civil or criminal; but
he may not be compelled to answer any questions which, In the opinion of the trial judge, would tend to criminate him nor may the
neglect or refusal of any defendant actually upon trial in a criminal
court, to offer himself as a witness be treated as creating any presumption against him, or be adversely referred to by court or
counsel during the trial."
By the act only adverse references to defendant's failure to
testify are prohibited. The question resolves Itself into:-"Was the
court's reference to the defendant's failure to testify adverse to the
defendant's cause?" On the contrary it is hard to conceive of any
conduct on the part of the court that could be more favorable to
the defendant's attitude. Had the court remained silent on the
defendant's failure to give any evidence in his behalf there might
have existed some doubt in the jury's mind as to whether or not they
should construe his refusal to testify to be treated as, In, and of itself, creating a presumption at law against him. The judge's charge In
clear and unequivocal language dispelled whatever doubt there
might have been. The court stated clearly and accurately the law
In order to aid the jury in arriving at a just conclusion. That Is a
part of the function of the court. If anything, the charge was favorable.
In Commonwealth vs Thomas 275 Pa. 137, the court charged,
"the fact that the defendant does not go on the stand or does not
produce any evidence In his own behalf, is not to be taken and considered any evidence of his guilt, for It, sometimes and often, does
occur that the defendants and their counsel are not convinced that
the Commonwealth has produced sufficient evidence which, even if
believed would be sufficient to warrant a conviction. So therefore
it Is presumed In this case that that reason prevails--."
Between the charge of the learned court below and the charge
of the court In Commonwealth vs Thomas, 275 Pa,. 137, we find no
material or substantial difference. The two are almost identical.
The very question in that case was the same as the question In this
case. And It was decided there that that charge did not violate
sec. 10, of the Act of May 23, 1887.
I think Commonwealth vs Thomas, being a recent decision of our
Supreme court, sufficient authority for dismissing the appeal.
An examination of the cases cited on page 141 which the court in
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that case cites as the reason for its conclusion, convince us beyond
doubt.
Judgment of the court below is affirmed and it is ordered that
the record be remitted for the purpose of execution.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Failure of the defendant to produce evidence that, if favorable,
he would be likely to produce, may be considered as Indicating, in
the absence of other explanation, that the defendant believed the evidence unfavorable. Omission to call one's wife as a witness may
be thus interpreted. Commonwealth v Weber, 167, Pa. 153.
Failure of the defendant to testify for himself might be attributed to his belief that his tesimony would not promote his acquittal.
But the Act of May 23, 1887 gives him the option whether to testify
or not and prohibits an unfavorable inference from his silence.
It shall not be treated by counsel, judge or jury as creating any
presumption against him. The court expressly said so nor did counsel take an inconsistent attitude.
The act also provides that the defendant's failure to testify
shall not "be adversely referred to by court or counsel during the
trial." Counsel do not seem to have sinned against this precept.
Did the court? It referred to the omission to testify but did not in
any way suggest that it had an inculpating significance. On the
contrary it suggested an explanation quite consistent with the innocence of the defendant. The reference was not adverse but
friendly and explanatory.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

BRESNE VS. SPEAR
Real Property-Uonveyancing-Reservations-- Exceptions
rights--Act of April 1, 1909, P. L. 91.

-

Mineral

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hollister owned land in which were gas and oil. He conveyed
the land to Spear, "reserving however, all the oil and gas therein.
with the right to extract the same at anytime." Three years later
he died having made no attempt to take any oil or gas, but leaving
a will in which he devised "all the real estate of which I am possessed to Bresne," a nephew. Spear has, since Hollister's death, begun
to take out the oil and gas. This is ejectment by Bresne.
OPINION OF COURT
Godfrey, J.

The question In this case is whether the clause in
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the deed to Spear "reserving however, all the oil and gas therein with
the right to extract the same at any time" Is a reservation or exception?
We cannot decide this question from the fact that apt words
of reservation were used. Kister v Reeser 98 Pa. 1. In Lillibrdge et
al vs Lackawanna Co. 143 Pa. 293, Mr. Justice Green said that an
exception and reservation differ in legal effect, "but in their creation, there Is no magic In words, aid if the meaning is
clear
either expression will operate for the purpose designated." Whether
the language used creates an exception or reservation must be determined from the intention of the parties ascertained from the
entire Instrument.
There is a technical distinction between a reservation and an
exception. "The purpose and effect of an exception and conveyance
is to except or exclude some part of the thing or things covered by
the general words of description therein-A reservation on the contrary as defined by the common law writers is a clause by which the
grantor reserves to himself some new thing, issuing out of the thing
granted and not in use before." Tiffany on Real Property 383.
This distinction appears in the following Pennsylvania cases:
Kister v Reeser, 98 Pa. 5.
Whitaker v Brown. 46 Pa. 197.
Moffitt v Lytle, 165 Pa. 173.
Buking v Tlorey's Brick Works 53 Pa. Super 358.
Sheffeld Water Co. v Elk Tanning Co., 53 Pa. 614.
Refler v Wayne Storage Water Power Co. 232 Pa. 282.
If the clause In question Is a reservation Its duration Is for the
life of the grantor. A reservation without words of inheritance
ends with the life of the grantor, IRister v Reeser 98 Pa. 1, Mandle v
Gharing 256 Pa 121. Whether this is still true since the passage of
the Act of April 1, 1909 P. L. 91, which provides in a deed the words
grant or convey or either of them shall be effective to pass a fee
simple estate although there be no words of Inheritance or of perpetuity, is not necessary for us to decide. We are of the opinion that
this statute is not applicable to reservations in a deed and words of
inheritance are still necessary to give the grantor more than an Interest for life.
The comparatively recent development of the sciences of geoglogy and mineralogy and multiplication of mechanical devices for
penetrating the earth's crust have greatly changed the uses and value of land. So it often happens that the owner of a farm sells the
land to one man, the iron or oil or gas to another and in Pennsylvania in mineral lands the surface or soil mav be separated from
the mineral right or right to dig under the surface for, and one person may own one of these rights and another person the other.
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Del. L. & M. R. Co, v Sanderson 109 Pa. 583.
Swint v McCalmont Oil Co. 184 Pa. 202.
It has been held that a right of way across a railroad, the use
of a well and water therein and a right to cut timber within a limited time were reservations. On the other hand the use of a way
then Ik existence, excepting In a grant certain parcels of land previously conveyed and three acres upon which our residence now is,
and excepting and reserving out of a grant certain fruit trees and
land on which they stand, have been held to be exceptions sec 18 C.
J. 340.
The learned counsel for the defendant In contending the clause in
question is a reservation relies upon two cases, Kster v Reeser, 98
Pa. 3. Moffit v Lytle 16 Pa 173. In the Kister case a clause iu a deed
conveying In fee a portion of a tract of land belonging to the, grantor
to- the effect "said A. R. grantor doth reserve a road 10 feet wide
along the line of C. P. to be shut at each end by a bar or gate" was
construed to constitute a reservation to the grantor of a right of
way and net an- exception from the conveyance of a 10 ft. wide strip
of land. In that case the court distinguishes clearly this situation
from the case where coal was saved and reserved as in Whitaker v
Brown 46 Pa 197 in which case it was held to be an exception, and
In the case of Moffit v Iytle supra. a right of road or land was
construed as a reservation and not an exception.
In Earl of Cardigan v Armitageo 2 B. & C, 197 the words of a deed
were "except and alwa-v reserved" and they were applied.among other
things to all the coals In the land granted together with the right
of way to take them and J. Bayle treated this as an exception. "An
exception of the coals which were part of the thing granted, part of
the land and In esse at the time and because they were never out of
the grantor, It would have remained to him and his heirs even without the words heirs which happened in that Instance to be added"
see Whitaker v Brown 46 Pa. 198.In the latter case the words used
were "saving and reserving nevertheless for his own use the coal
contained In certain land together with free Ingress and egress by
wagon were held to be an exception. In Mannerback v Pa. R. Co.
16 Pa, Sup 622, the words In controversy were "excepting and
forever reserving the graveyard on the lands hereby conveyed at all
times hereafter to enter thereon without hindrance or denial,"
which was held to be an exception. In Little v Greep 238 'Pa. 534 a
provision in Its lease for a certain tract for the purpose of mining
the underlying coal-which coal is hereby reserved for the protection
of a farm building constitutes an exception and not a reservation.
It has been contended that gas or oil cannot be the subject of
an exception. It is said of these substances as it is of water that
they are not the subject of ownership until reduced to possession
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but this refers only to the possibility of their loss by the owner of
the land owing to their escape into adjoining land and they are
more usually regarded as belonging to the owner of the land in which
they happen to be. Tiffany on Real Property 221. In Moore v
Griffin 83 Pa. 395 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 477 oil and gas were the subject
of an exception. We do not see why the right to remove oil or gas
cannot be excepted in a deed.
We think the case of Mandle v Gharing 256 Pa. 121 supports the
contention of the counsel for the plaintiff and is analogous and controls the case at bar. The words there used were "excepting and
reserving however, from the above, all the oil and gas produced from
the said undivided one fourth of the above described land." The court
held "the entire estate of the oil and gas was reserved from the
grant leaving in the grantor the same title to the oil and gas as he
would have had in the coal and other minerals had they been reserved.
We axe unable to see the force of defendant's argument that the reservation clause gave the grantor during his life the oil and gas produced at the will and expense of the grantees. This would be in effect the reservation of nothing as it certainly could not be expected
that the grantees would develop the territory at their own expense for
the sole benefit of the grantor. Had the grantor intended the clause
in quesion as claimed by defendant simply to reserve for his life
the undivided one-fourth of the oil and gas on the premises when
produced to the surface at the will and expense of the grantees he
would have said so in terms and would not have excepted all the
oil and gas from the grants. We think the intention of the parties
to the deed was that Gharing should retain the oil and gas from the
grant and that therefore the clause in question created an exception
and not a reservation."
The rule that the language making an exception or reservation in
a deed is to be construed most favorably to the grantee applies only
where the language is doubtful and does not obtain where the language Is sufficiently clear to define the character and extent of the
exception or reservation. Richardson v Clements 89 Pa. 503.
We hold, upon the cases and authorities cited, the clause In
the deed in question "reserving however, all the oil and gas therein
with the right to extract the same at any time" to be and exception
and not a reservation.
We do not see the difference between this and the cases where
land, right of way in existence and minerals etc.. were held to be exceptions; despite the fluidity of the subject in the exception in controversy. And we think the language used sufficiently clear and the
intention of the parties sufficiently manifested to create an exception.
Judgment for plaintiff, Bresne.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The Judgment is affirmed.

SARA ADAMS VS. CHARLES ADAMS
Real property-Wills--Intent of testator-Vested Remainders--Con
tingent Remainders-Construction of ambiguous wills.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
This case rests upon the construction of a will made by A in
which he devised land to his wife for life and then to his sons.
Charles and John, when they reach the age of 21 respectively. If
either should die before obtaining possession his share should go to
the other. They reached age in 1916 and 1918, Widow has Just
died but John had previously died after he became 21, leaving a child
Sara. the plaintiff. She brings ejectment for John's share against
Charles.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Lieberman. J. In construing a will the testator's intention in the
light of the surrounding circumstances and as ascertained from the
whole will must prevail. Wrongful use of words or expressions will
not be destructive to the plain intent of testator. 5 Binney 252,
273 Pa. 573, 182 Pa. 131.
What was in the testator's mind when he made his will? He
wished to take care of his widow and then give the land to his
sons. But he did not want the latter to have the property during
their minority, so he made the son's shares contingent upon their
reaching 21 years. Up to this stage It can easily be seen that the
testator never thought that his sons would attain majority before his
widow would die. If he had suspected otherwise he would not
have put in the contingency that his sons reach majority.
We now come to the clause "if either should die before obtaining
possession, his share should go to the other." What did A mean by
this sentence? We cannot say that the testator meant this clause
to be connected with the other so as to mean "if either does not
reach 21 years nor obtain possession then to the survivor." That
would be absurd as neither son could get possession until be became
21 years. As we said above the testator never thought that his sons
would reach majority during his widow's lifetime. With this
situation before him another thought came to him-suppose one son
dies after the widow dies but before he became 21 years. Knowing
that the sons could not get possession before their majority and because of this, In his mind he used these words "possession" and "21
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years" synonomously and he inserted the clause "if either dies before obtaining possession," then his sharb should go to the other.
We, can see no other reason for the testator using the phrase
"before obtaining possession" when 'we consider what was in his
mind when he wrote it. The thought uppermost In his mind was
the Protection of the property so that it would not fall into infants'
hand&s
Being satisfied that the testator's intention was to give John's
share to Charles, only if the former died before the age of 21, we
must now decide what the plaintiff as John's heir took. The law
favors vested rather than contingent estates and unless it clearly
appears from the: context of the will or the circumstances of the
case that a contingent Interest was intended, the remainder will be
regarded as vested on death of testator. Tatham's Estate, 250 Pa.
269.
Nothing in this case shows that the testator intended to postpone the vesting, but, in fact, everything tends to show that he
merely wanted to prevent the possession and the enjoyment of
the land until his sons had reached their majority. Following this
policy the courts hold that if there is a life estate given and after
the life tenant's death, the remainder to certain persons "when"
they attain a specified age." the latter take a vested remainder
liable to be divested if they do not reach the specified age. Amer.
& Eng. Encyc. of Law, VoL &0, Page 7TG, Smith's Estate, 7 Dist.
Seemingly the con236, 189 Pa. 5S7. 212 Pa. 119. 31 Sun. 614.
struction that the remainder vests upon the testator's death Is more
used than when other
-usually given when the word "when" is
words, such aa "In case he reaches 21" or "at or if he reaches 21"
are used.
Regardless of whether John's share was vested or contingent
at death of testator. when John attained his majority, his share
became an absolute vested rpmainder without any possibility of
ever being divested. Having an- estate In land in form of a remainder of which estate he could never be divested, there, bas never been
any doubt that his share could pass by descent or devise to his
The plaintiff having title, can therefore mainheirs. 6 Dist. 361.
tain this action. Judgment for the plaIntiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
As in respect to so many wills, the function of the court is to
He has
say what the testator meant. His mind is inscrutable.
clothed his thoughts In words which are ambiguous. Under one
interpretation, a result that Is abhorrent will be reached. The
daughter of John will take nothing, and her uncle Charles. will take
what would have been John's share. In order to avert this distressing result, a result which It is not likely that the testator would
have intended, the learned court below has construed "obtaining pos-
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session" to mean, acquiring, by reaching 21 years of age, the remainder after the widow's life estate. That remainder was contingent, until John lived to be 21 years old.
If "obtaining possession" means becoming absolute owner in
fee by reaching 21 years, and succeeding to the possession, by the
extinction of the particular estate of the widow, then since John,
though reaching 21 years, has died before the widow, his share has
ended, and been transferred to his brother Charles.
We approve of the decision of the learned court below.
It
produces results more agreeable to the Instincts that ordinarily operate in human nature. It avoids the deprivation of John's daughter, who, under the intestate law, would have taken his share.
Judgment affirmed.
P. S.-The attempt to substitute for the facts submitted, a restatement, is not approved. The court should decide cases according
to the facts, not Its revised version of them.
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BOOK REVIEW
Regulation of Public Utilities, by the Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, by Wendell Y. Blanning, Soney & Sage
Company, 1924.
The modest preface of this book suggests that it "may be
of value, to those attorneys who have occasion to appear before
the Commission, and who have not been able to give special attention to its law and practice." The number of such attorneys
is considerable and the utility of this book to them Is, we think
unquestionable.
It contains the 'tatistics relating to the commission, its rules
of practice, its general orders and rulings, and a collection of
forms. The book has 350 pages. The first 134 pages embrace 12
chapters, whose titles will sufficiently indicate their topics. They
are: Constitutional Restrictions on Regulation, Interstate Commerce, Constitutionality of the Public Service Company Law,
Companies subject to regulation, Valuation, Rates, Service, Corporate Acts requiring approval, Grade Crossings, Commission
Control of Municipalities, Mis6ellaneous Provisions of the Statute,
Procedure before the Commission.
The book is brief, and terse, and must be useful to the practitioner.
The juvenility of the legislative mind has been amusir~ly
illustrated In the speed with which this species of legislation,
as if highly contageous, has flitted from state to state. The
forging of fetters on the business of the people, seems not to encounter reluctance.
We have the law, and it is not going to
be repealed. Mr. Blannihg's book is going to be serviceable to
many a puzzled business man and lawyer. We commend It, an
practical and trustworthy.

